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Payment Card Rewards? 
By Fumiko Hayashi
P
ayment card rewards programs have become increasingly popular 
in the United States. Nearly all large credit card issuers offer re-
wards to customers for using their cards, as do more than a third 
of depository institutions for using debit cards. Recent surveys suggest 
that many consumers now receive rewards.1 And rewards are becoming 
more generous and diversified, ranging from 5 percent cash-back bo-
nuses for gasoline purchases, to free airline miles, to gifts to charity. 
But do consumers really benefit from rewards? In the United States, 
rewards are paid for primarily by the fees charged to merchants, and 
merchants may pass on the fees to consumers as higher retail prices. 
Further, some regulators and analysts claim that rewards may send con-
sumers distorted price signals, which in turn may lead consumers to 
choose payment methods that are less efficient to society. 
Card networks and merchants have taken opposing sides in the 
rewards debate. Card networks claim their fee structures, including re-
wards, are crucial to achieving the right balance between merchant ac-
ceptance and consumer usage of their cards. Rewards can also reduce 
the total costs to society by inducing more consumers to switch from 
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costly payment methods, such as checks, to less costly payment cards. 
Merchants benefit as well, they claim, because rewards card users make 
higher-value transactions than other consumers. Finally, more gener-
ous rewards are even more beneficial to consumers because they receive 
more as they make more card transactions.
Merchants, on the other hand, claim they pay for the rewards 
through their fees to card issuers. They argue that competitive pres-
sures and customer expectations prevent them from rejecting cards 
even though the fees outweigh their benefits. They reject the idea that 
accepting rewards cards is profitable despite the higher fees. Instead, 
they argue that customers with rewards cards spend more than those 
without rewards cards simply because their incomes are higher—not 
because they receive more rewards. Finally, they argue that more gener-
ous rewards actually harm consumers, because higher fees to merchants 
lead to higher prices for goods and services. 
Who ultimately pays for rewards programs is not completely clear. 
It is difficult to prove that consumers use payment cards more often 
or spend more because of rewards. Whether rewards are beneficial to 
consumers or to society depends on various factors, including who ulti-
mately pays for rewards and how rewards affect consumer behavior. 
This article seeks to provide insight into these issues by consider-
ing whether current rewards programs benefit consumers and society. 
The first section provides an overview of U.S. payment card rewards 
programs, including fee structures and potential roles of rewards. The 
second section explores whether rewards programs are “efficient” and 
“welfare-enhancing.” While definitive answers await further data, the 
analysis in this article suggests that the currently provided payment 
card rewards programs, especially credit card rewards programs, are not 
likely to be efficient. Further, rewards may potentially be too generous, 
lowering overall consumer welfare. 
I.  INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
This section provides some background on the U.S. payment card 
industry and its rewards programs. First, it briefly describes how pay-
ment card rewards programs have evolved and how prevalent they are. 
Next, it shows the relationship between the rewards and other fees, such Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  39
as interchange fees and merchant discount fees. Finally, it discusses the 
roles of rewards cards.
Payment card rewards in the united states
Credit card rewards have more than 25 years of history in the Unit-
ed States. In 1984, Diners Club first introduced a rewards program that 
offered airline miles to cardholding customers. In the 1990s, rewards 
programs became more diversified. For example, Discover started of-
fering a cash-back bonus based on purchase volume. Other types of 
rewards that emerged in the decade ranged from discounts on products 
sold by co-branded or affiliates of card issuers to rewards point dona-
tions to charities, alumni associations, and environmental groups. 
As competition for cardholders intensified, issuers made their rewards 
programs more generous. Today, 3 to 5 percent cash-back bonuses are 
common on purchases at certain types of retailers. Historically, Ameri-
can Express, Diners Club, and Discover have offered the most generous 
rewards, but recently MasterCard’s World card and Visa’s Signature card 
have joined them.
Debit card rewards are relatively new. In the United States, consum-
ers authorize their debit card transactions in one of two ways: with PIN 
debit authorization, where the consumer types a personal identification 
number at the point of sale; and with signature debit authorization, 
where the consumer signs a receipt. A typical U.S. debit card can carry 
out both PIN and signature debit transactions, but consumers are more 
likely to receive rewards using their signature.2 Rewards are less gener-
ous for debit cards than credit cards. According to industry experts, 
credit card rewards are typically about 1 percent of the purchase value, 
compared to about 0.25 percent for typical debit card rewards.3,4    
While the growth of rewards programs has been rapid, many ana-
lysts believe less than half of U.S. consumers have a rewards card or ac-
tively participate in a rewards program. Estimates of rewards participa-
tion rates, however, vary widely. One study suggested about 70 percent 
of consumers with at least one general purpose credit card have a rewards 
credit card (Visa USA). Another study estimated that about one-third of 
consumers who hold both credit and debit cards hold a rewards card.5 
Still another study suggested that more than 40 percent of rewards card-
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2004 Survey of Consumer Finance, about 90 percent of U.S. households 
have at least one payment card, about 72 percent have a credit card, 
about 76 percent have a debit card, and about 58 percent have both 
credit and debit cards. 
Relationship between rewards and merchant fees
It is even less clear who ultimately pays for rewards programs. In the 
United States, each card issuer typically runs its own rewards programs 
and has multiple revenue sources, including fees paid by merchants. 
This subsection explains fee structures, fee levels, and the relationship 
between rewards and merchant fees. 
Card issuers typically have several potential revenue sources to pay 
for rewards. Sources include interest from cardholders with a positive 
credit card balance, fees to cardholders (such as annual fees, penalty 
fees, and cash advance fees), and merchant fees (such as interchange 
fees and merchant discount fees for American Express, Diners Club 
and Discover). Issuers can tap any of these sources to finance rewards, 
but experts suggest they rely mainly on merchant fees. 
Payment card schemes generally take one of two principal forms. 
One is a four-party scheme comprising cardholders, merchants, card 
issuers, and merchant acquirers.6 Card issuers and merchant acquirers 
are members of a payment card network, such as MasterCard or Visa, 
or a regional debit card network, such as Star, NYCE, or Pulse. The 
card network sets the rates for the interchange fee, which is typically 
paid by the merchant acquirer to the card issuer.7 The merchant pays a 
merchant fee to the merchant acquirer, who sets the merchant fee. Typi-
cally, the merchant acquirer passes through the entire interchange fee 
to the merchant in the merchant fee.8 The cardholder receives rewards 
from, or pays cardholder fees to, the card issuer, who sets the level of the 
rewards and cardholder fees.9
The other form is a three-party scheme, which comprises card-
holders, merchants, and a card network, such as American Express or 
Discover. In contrast to the four-party schemes, there is no explicit 
interchange fee because the card network acts as both card issuer and 
merchant acquirer. The merchant pays a merchant fee to the card net-
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fee to, the network. The network sets the rates for merchant fees and 
cardholder fees and the levels for rewards.
Figure 1 shows the flow of payments and fees in a four-party 
scheme network. When the card issuer obtains funds from the card-
holder account—$100 in this example—it provides rewards to the 
cardholder, say 1 percent of the purchase value, or $1. The card issuer 
retains a portion of the funds as an interchange fee. In this example, 
the interchange fee rate is 2 percent of the purchase value, or $2. The 
card issuer then sends $98 to the merchant acquirer, who charges the 
merchant a processing fee plus other fees of $.50, in addition to the 
interchange fee. The merchant acquirer then deposits $97.50 to the 
merchant account. 
The actual levels of fees vary by transaction. Merchant fees signifi-
cantly vary by scheme and card type. The fees for credit card transac-
tions are the highest, followed by the fees for signature-debit card trans-
actions. The fees for PIN-debit card transactions are the lowest. Among 
merchant fees for credit cards, American Express has the highest and 
Discover has the lowest (Chart 1). 
Figure1
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A major portion of a merchant fee goes to the card issuer. For ex-
ample, in a four-party scheme, the interchange fee is estimated to be 
70-80 percent of the merchant fee.10 According to one study, 45 percent 
of interchange fees are used for rewards programs (Chart 2) (Dowson 
and Hugener).11 The variation in card issuers’ fee revenues from mer-
chants may explain the variation in the levels of rewards (along with the 
different values of credit card and debit card rewards). 
While rewards and merchant fees are related, it is not clear how 
closely. Over the past several years in the United States, we have ob-
served increasingly more generous rewards as well as rising interchange 
and merchant fees. But this does not necessarily imply that rewards 
have caused merchant fees to rise. Merchant fees depend not only on 
rewards but also on the costs of handling a card transaction by the card 
issuer or the acquirer, as well as their profit margins. Rewards can be 
financed by different sources, including reducing the card issuer’s profit 
margin. Therefore, higher merchant fees do not necessarily imply more 
generous rewards, and vice versa. 
chart 1
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Still, in some cases a close positive relationship between rewards 
and interchange fees (and merchant fees) is evident. In 2005, Master-
Card and Visa introduced new credit card categories that charge higher 
interchange fees to merchants and provide more generous rewards to 
card users. Both MasterCard and Visa now offer four credit card cat-
egories. MasterCard’s Core Value and Visa’s Traditional cards provide 
the least generous rewards (or no rewards), while MasterCard’s World 
Elite and Visa’s Signature Preferred cards provide the most generous 
rewards. Chart 3 shows the 2007 interchange fee rates for Master-
Card and Visa at retail stores. Tier I includes the rates for retail stores 
that generate the highest number or value of transactions, while Base 
includes the rates for retail stores that generate the least. Regardless 
of their transaction volume, merchants consistently pay higher inter-
change fees for cards with more generous rewards.
Before these new categories were introduced, each merchant paid 
one common interchange fee rate for MasterCard’s or Visa’s credit 
cards.12 The interchange fee rate for MasterCard’s Core Value or Visa’s 
Traditional cards—the lowest among the rates for the new categories—
chart 2
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was set at the same level as this common interchange fee rate, and the 
rates for the other categories were set higher (Chart 4). This could im-
ply that the issuer’s costs and profit margin from interchange fees have 
not changed.
Roles of payment card rewards
Payment card rewards likely play different roles, depending on the 
maturity of the payment card industry. When the industry is in its 
infant stage, rewards can be used to induce consumers to adopt the 
cards. Rewards may also help consumers learn the various features of 
the card. When the industry matures, rewards may still induce con-
sumers to switch to payment cards from other means of payment, such 
as cash and checks. If rewards are set appropriately, then rewards may 
positively affect consumers, merchants, and the payments system as a 
whole—but, if not, rewards may potentially harm them. 
Chart 3
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Chart 4
PANEl A: INTERCHANGE FEES FOR A $50 TRANSACTION 
AT A SMAllEST RETAIl STORE–VISA
Sources: American Banker; EFT Data Book; MasterCard International; Visa USA
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New payment card networks face a typical chicken-and-egg prob-
lem—the benefits to consumers from holding a card depend on how 
many merchants accept the card, and vice versa. Once a card network 
reaches a certain threshold of consumers and merchants, the benefits 
no longer depend on the number of consumers and merchants. Re-
wards to consumers can help achieve such a threshold, or critical mass. 
As more consumers join the card network, more merchants join to 
serve them. 
Rewards can also help introduce consumers to the various features 
of the card. When payment cards were new, many consumers were not 
fully aware of their benefits—such as transaction speed, convenience, 
security, record-keeping ease, and float.13 Consumers who were unfa-
miliar with a card were likely to undervalue its benefits and may have 
chosen another payment method, such as cash or checks. But with 
rewards as an incentive, many consumers soon learned the value of 
payment cards. Once the benefits of the cards became clear, some con-
sumers may have kept using them even without receiving rewards. 
Payment card rewards may also play a role even after the indus-
try matures and consumers become aware of the benefits of using a 
card. In the payment market, consumers choose a payment method 
from a set of payment methods the merchant accepts. While the con-
sumer’s choice of method affects the merchant’s benefits and costs, the 
consumer does not consider these factors when choosing a payment 
method. Rewards, however, can be set to reflect the merchant’s benefits 
and costs. Thus, they can influence a consumer to choose a method 
that provides a benefit to the merchant.
Suppose a consumer does not receive rewards and is indifferent to 
using a payment card or cash. Suppose also the payment card transac-
tion costs the merchant less than a cash transaction. Both parties would 
be better off if the merchant provided rewards reflecting the cost dif-
ferential between the two transactions. Consumers are more likely to 
use payment cards due to rewards, and merchants can save the costs of 
handling transactions even after they pay for rewards. Merchants may 
even lower their prices for final goods and services, further benefit-
ting consumers. With rewards set appropriately, both merchants and 
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system as a whole would also likely be less because the transaction costs 
for everyone involved would be less. 
If, on the other hand, rewards do not reflect merchant’s costs and 
benefits, they may induce consumers to use payment methods that are 
more costly to merchants. It is possible that more generous rewards lead 
to higher merchant fees, making payment cards more costly to mer-
chants than alternative payment methods. If this happens, merchants 
may set higher retail prices. If the costs of handling a card transaction 
increase as the transaction value increases, generous rewards to some 
consumers may come with a higher price to society. 
II.  ARE  CURRENT  REWARDS  BENEFICIAL  IN  THE 
UNITED STATES?
As discussed in the last section, payment card rewards may have 
both positive and negative effects. But what are the net effects of re-
wards  programs  on  society  and  consumers? This  section  considers 
whether payments made using the current fee structure, including re-
wards, enhance welfare, compared with payments made without re-
wards or without payment cards. The first subsection considers this 
from the view point of society as a whole, and the second subsection 
from the point of view of consumers alone. 
is the current fee structure beneficial to society as a whole?
Economics literature typically uses efficiency as the criterion for an-
swering questions of benefits to society. Efficiency is defined as produc-
ing the greatest total social value using the least possible social cost. This 
subsection considers the most efficient fee structure for payment cards. 
Using the most efficient fee structure as the standard for comparison, 
the analysis considers whether the current fee structure is more efficient 
than a system that does not offer rewards or use payment cards. 
Efficiency is usually measured by social welfare, which aggregates the 
welfare of all parties involved in the market. Each party’s welfare is mea-
sured in monetary terms. For example, a supplier’s welfare is equivalent 
to the supplier’s profit. A consumer’s welfare is the difference between 
the total amount the consumer is willing to pay and the total amount 
the consumer actually pays. In the payment card market, the parties are 
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card issuers, and card networks. Because payment cards substitute for 
alternative payment methods, such as cash and checks, consumers who 
use those payment methods and the payment service providers of those 
methods are also considered. Thus, the most efficient payment card fee 
structure maximizes the aggregate welfare of all these parties. 
This analysis first considers the most efficient fee structure in the 
presence of so-called usage externalities. An externality is the effect of 
one agent’s action on the benefits or costs of another agent whose ben-
efits or costs are not taken into account when an economic decision 
is made. In the payment card industry, two types of externalities exist. 
One is membership externality, which is equivalent to the chicken-
and-egg problem discussed in the previous section. The other is usage 
externality. Typically, consumers determine the payment method, and 
their private incentives for using a particular method do not necessarily 
reflect the merchant’s benefits or costs. As a result, the usage externality 
arises from the consumer’s decision. The U.S. payment card industry 
is mature and has reached its critical mass; thus, the chicken-and-egg 
problem is no longer a concern. The usage externality still exists, how-
ever, even after the industry matures. 
Several theoretical studies have examined the most efficient fee 
structure. Rochet and Tirole (2002) took into account the usage ex-
ternality. In their model, consumers use cards when their transactional 
benefit exceeds the cardholder fee. A card offers consumers several 
transactional  benefits,  including  a  lower  cost  than  other  payment 
methods, such as cash and checks. A card transaction may also reduce 
the time spent at the cashier and eliminate the time and cost of obtain-
ing cash from an ATM or bank teller. In addition, a card transaction 
may enhance security, simplify recordkeeping, and so on. A consumer’s 
transactional benefit from a card is assumed to vary by consumer. Some 
consumers’ transactional benefit from a card could be negative, which 
means they receive less benefit from a card than alternative payment 
methods. In the model, such consumers do not use the card unless they 
receive rewards. 
In contrast, a merchant’s transactional benefit from a card is assumed 
to be common across merchants. Their transactional benefit includes 
lower handling costs compared to other payment methods and more 
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merchants accept the cards even when the merchant fee exceeds their 
transactional benefit. Merchants often claim that competitive pressures 
and customer expectations may prevent them from rejecting cards. If 
they reject cards, they may lose customers to their rivals. Card networks 
claim that card transactions may bring merchants other benefits than 
transactional benefit. For example, accepting the cards may increase sales 
by inducing some consumers to switch from merchants who do not ac-
cept the cards or to purchase more goods or services. 
Rochet and Tirole found that when merchants are not allowed to 
set different prices according to the payment methods chosen by their 
customers, the most efficient cardholder fee depends on two elements. 
The first element is the payment card service providers’ joint net cost 
of handling a card transaction. The net cost includes the real resources 
required by the acquirer, the card network, and the card issuer, as well 
as the payment service providers’ opportunity cost of giving up the 
profit from a transaction made using another payment method. The 
second element is the merchant’s transactional benefit from a card 
transaction.14 The most efficient cardholder fee is the difference be-
tween these two elements. When the payment service providers’ joint 
net cost exceeds the merchant’s transaction benefit, the most efficient 
cardholder fee is positive. When the payment service providers’ net 
joint cost is less than the merchant’s transaction benefit, the most ef-
ficient cardholder fee is negative—in other words, a reward. Thus, 
providing payment card rewards can maximize efficiency only when 
the merchant’s transactional benefit exceeds the payment service pro-
viders’ joint net cost of a card transaction.
Hayashi (2008a) considered the most efficient fee structure under 
more realistic assumptions. Specifically, the analysis relaxed two assump-
tions in Rochet and Tirole’s model. The first assumption concerned a 
consumer’s demand for goods. Rochet and Tirole assumed that con-
sumers purchase a fixed number of goods and services and thus make 
a fixed number of transactions, regardless of product price. Hayashi as-
sumed that the number of transactions may vary by product price. The 
second assumption concerned the costs, fees, and benefits of a given 
payment method. Rochet and Tirole assumed that the costs, fees, and 
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amount of the transaction. Hayashi’s model allowed them to increase as 
the dollar amount of the transaction increase. 
Hayashi found that the most efficient cardholder fee derived by 
Rochet and Tirole still generally holds the most efficient. Hayashi fur-
ther showed that two other conditions must generally be met to maxi-
mize social welfare. These conditions concern merchant fees and re-
tail prices. To achieve the highest social welfare without making either 
merchants or payment service providers earn negative profits, 1) card 
networks (or their member acquirers) should set the merchant fee at the 
merchant transactional benefit, and 2) merchants should set retail prices 
at their marginal costs. And, as before, the cardholder fee should be set 
at the most efficient level determined by the Rochet and Tirole model. 
One can try to quantify the most efficient cardholder fees by using 
information on the costs and benefits of each payment method. A few 
studies estimate the costs and benefits for various payment methods in 
the United States. Food Marketing Institute (FMI) (1998) estimated 
supermarket and grocery store costs of various payment methods in 
1997. Garcia-Swartz and others (2006 a and b) estimated the costs and 
benefits for consumers and financial institutions. These studies are not 
ideal for calculating the most efficient cardholder fees, especially be-
cause the information on merchant costs is dated.15 Nevertheless, they 
provide a benchmark because there are no other comprehensive cost 
studies in the United States.16 
Table 1 shows the most efficient cardholder fee for a credit card 
and a debit card transaction.17,18 The table assumes several hypothetical 
economies: In each of the economies only two payment options are 
available. For example, in one economy two options are credit cards 
and cash and in another economy they are debit cards and check. Each 
column represents one economy. The two payment options are credit 
cards and either cash (column 1), check (column 2), or debit card (col-
umn 3); and debit cards and either cash (column 4), check (column 5), 
or credit card (column 6).19 The table shows the most efficient cardhold-
er fees for the two different transaction values used in FMI and Garcia-
Swartz and others: an $11.52 transaction and a $54.24 transaction. 
The table yields the following results: When the two payment op-
tions are credit cards and cash (column 1), the most efficient credit 
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a $54.24 transaction (that is, the most efficient credit card reward is 
6.1 cents). When the two payment options are debit cards and checks 
(column 5), the most efficient debit cardholder fee is 4.9 cents for a 
$11.52 transaction and 10.4 cents for a $54.24 transaction. When the 
two payment options are credit cards and debit cards, the most efficient 
cardholder fee can be calculated in two ways. One way is to calculate the 
most efficient credit cardholder fee, given the actual cardholder fee of 
debit card (column 3). The other way is to calculate the most efficient 
debit cardholder fee, given the actual cardholder fee of credit card (col-
umn 6). According to Garcia-Swartz and others, the debit cardholder 
fee is 13 cents for both transaction values.20 Given that fee, the most 
efficient credit cardholder fee is 17.9 cents for an $11.52 transaction 
and 25.6 cents for a $54.24 transaction (column 3). Garcia-Swartz and 
others reported that the credit cardholder fees are -10.3 cents (reward) 
for an $11.52 transaction and -50 cents (reward) for a $54.24 transac-
tion. Given those fees, the most efficient debit cardholder fees are both 
negative—that is, rewards of 15.2 cents and 62.6 cents, respectively 
(column 6). 
There are three main findings in Table 1. First, providing rewards 
on credit cards and debit cards is likely efficient for large-value cash 
transactions but likely inefficient for small-value cash transactions (col-
umns 1 and 4).21 Most cash transactions are likely to be small. In fact, 
according to FMI, the average cash transaction is $11.52. Second, when 
checks are the other payment choice, providing rewards on either credit 
or debit card is not likely to maximize social welfare (columns 2 and 5). 
Third, current credit card rewards are too generous relative to current 
table 1




Payment method  Credit  Debit
Case  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Alternative method  Cash  Check  Debit  Cash  Check  Credit
Transaction value   $11.52   14.8  9.8  17.9  9.9  4.9  -15.2
per transaction   $54.24   -6.1  23.0  25.6  -18.7  10.4  -62.6
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debit cardholder fees. Indeed, the results indicate that credit card trans-
actions should carry fees, not rewards (column 3).22 
It should be noted that the fees in Table 1 are potentially over-
estimated if merchants’ transactional costs of cash or checks are un-
derestimated or if banks’ card processing costs are overestimated.23 As 
mentioned, the merchant cost information is based on 1997 data, and 
the costs studies mainly gathered information from supermarkets and 
grocery stores. More recent and comprehensive costs studies are re-
quired to more accurately quantify the efficient cardholder fees. As a 
result of new cost studies, offering rewards on credit and debit cards 
to substitute for cash and check transactions might possibly become 
justifiable from the social welfare point of view. However, it is very 
unlikely that providing credit card rewards to substitute for debit card 
transactions becomes justifiable, because new information will likely 
adjust merchants’ transactional benefits of credit cards and debit cards 
in the same direction, and it will also likely adjust banks’ processing 
costs of these cards in the same direction. 
Table 1 suggests that in most cases providing rewards is not ef-
ficient and thus reducing the rewards level to zero would enhance 
social welfare. However, as argued above, more updated and compre-
hensive cost studies might reverse the results—providing rewards to 
substitute cards for cash and checks may become the most efficient. If 
this is the case, the current level of rewards may or may not enhance 
social welfare compared with zero rewards. The answer depends on 
how far the most efficient level of rewards is to the current level of 
rewards and to zero rewards. If the former is the closer, then the cur-
rent level of rewards is likely to enhance social welfare. Otherwise, 
the opposite is likely to be true. 
If the current level of rewards is too high, then that level may not 
only offer less social welfare than zero rewards, but it may also poten-
tially offer less social welfare than making transactions without pay-
ment cards at all. Rewards that exceed a certain level unlikely play a 
role of reducing the total costs to society. All remaining paper-based 
transactions may be made either because payment card transactions are 
infeasible or because consumers may not qualify for payment cards (or 
bank accounts).24 Further, additional rewards may potentially increase 
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sources of handling a card transaction, especially a credit card trans-
action, increase as the dollar amount of the transaction increases. A 
higher level of rewards may raise the merchant fees and ultimately raise 
retail prices, which may increase the value of the transaction. Thus, 
a higher level of rewards may require more real resources to society. 
If this additional resource cost is substantial, then social welfare with 
very generous rewards may potentially be lower than social welfare 
without cards at all (Hayashi 2008b). 
is the current fee structure beneficial to consumers? 
Is the current fee structure welfare enhancing to consumers? Re-
wards may affect each individual consumer’s welfare differently. For 
instance, rewards may make card-using consumers better off but cash-
using consumers worse off. This subsection considers how the current-
ly provided rewards affect welfares of different types of consumers and 
the welfare of consumers as a whole. 
Rewards levels that enhance social welfare do not necessarily en-
hance consumer welfare. Consumer welfare is influenced not only by 
rewards levels but also by prices for goods and services. The influence 
of retail prices on consumer welfare is likely to be more significant than 
that on overall social welfare. For example, given current rewards levels, 
higher retail prices lower consumer welfare but not necessarily social 
welfare, because they may raise profits for merchants’ or payment card 
service providers, offsetting the consumer welfare losses. Consumer 
welfare may potentially be higher with less generous rewards accompa-
nied by lower retail prices than with the most efficient level of rewards 
accompanied by higher retail prices.
Reward levels and retail prices affect the welfare of each individual 
consumer differently. Although typical U.S. consumers use payment 
cards as well as cash and checks, some consumers use payment cards 
more exclusively, while others use cash or checks more exclusively. If 
more generous rewards imply higher prices for all consumers regardless 
of their payment methods, then they may make consumers who tend 
to use cash and checks worse off. At the same time, more generous 
rewards may make consumers who tend to use rewards payment cards 
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Evaluating the effects of rewards on consumer welfare, therefore, 
requires knowing how the level of rewards affects retail prices. It is pos-
sible that rewards levels do not affect retail prices, but such cases are 
rather limited. First, if rewards are fully financed by card issuers giving 
up their profit margins, then rewards do not affect merchant fees or, in 
turn, retail prices. Second, even if rewards are at least partly financed by 
merchant fees, monopoly merchants who absorb all consumer surplus-
es from some of their customers may not increase their retail prices. If 
doing so, they would lose some customers, although their mark-ups 
from the other customers might increase (Hayashi 2006). In either 
case, since the retail prices do not vary by rewards level, consumers 
who tend to use cash and checks are unlikely to be affected, while con-
sumers who tend to use payment cards may be better off with a higher 
level of rewards. In most cases, however, higher levels of rewards may 
imply higher retail prices, as long as the merchant fee exceeds the mer-
chant’s transactional benefit from a card transaction.25 To what degree 
the rewards levels and retail prices are correlated is difficult to measure 
empirically.26 Even theoretically, there is no one-to-one relationship be-
tween the level of rewards and retail prices.
Some theoretical studies assume that, although rewards levels affect 
merchant fees, they do not affect the retail prices faced by consumers 
who do not use cards. This is possible either if merchants set different 
prices according to the payment methods or if each merchant serves ei-
ther card-using consumers only or non-card-using consumers only. In 
these cases, rewards do not affect consumers who use cash and checks. 
Also, rewards may have little effects on the welfare of consumers who 
use cards, because these card users pay higher retail prices to finance 
rewards they receive. 
In reality, however, most U.S. merchants serve both types of con-
sumers and charge them the same prices. To reflect this reality, from 
this point on the analysis assumes that retail prices are common across 
all consumers. 
Consumers who use cash and checks exclusively would be worse off 
with any rewards levels that are higher than the most efficient rewards 
level. They would also be worse off than in an economy without cards, 
as long as the retail prices are higher (which occurs when merchants 
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Both retail prices and levels of rewards affect the welfare of card-
using consumers. The net effect of rewards on the welfare of card-using 
consumers depends on their transactional benefit from cards. For some 
card-using consumers, a card transaction gives them negative transac-
tional benefit, and thus they do not use cards without receiving re-
wards. These marginal card users, who use cards only when they receive 
rewards, are likely to be worse off due to rewards because rewards may 
not be sufficient to cover their negative transactional benefit and their 
welfare loss through higher retail prices. In contrast, consumers whose 
transactional benefit from a card is positive—consumers who use cards 
even without receiving rewards—are likely to be better off because re-
wards and their transactional benefit from a card may be enough to 
offset the price increase. In some cases, however, even these consumers 
may become worse off. When resource costs of handling a card transac-
tion is proportional to the transaction value, a higher level of rewards 
requires more resources, and those costs may further raise retail prices. 
As a result, rewards may not be sufficient to offset the effect of higher 
retail prices on the welfare of some card-using consumers even if their 
transactional benefit from cards is positive.
How the levels of rewards affect consumer welfare on net depends 
on various factors. For example, knowing how rewards levels affect 
merchant fees and thus retail prices is critical to consider the effects of 
rewards on the welfare of each individual consumer, and thus on the 
welfare of consumers as a whole. As discussed above, rewards may affect 
differently those consumers who use cash and checks more exclusively, 
compared to those who use cards more exclusively. Rewards also affect 
differently the various consumers who use cards: consumers who use 
cards even without rewards and consumers who use cards only when 
they receive rewards. As a result, knowing the shares of those consum-
ers—what percentage of consumers use cash and checks exclusively, 
what percentage of consumers use cards with rewards, and what per-
centage of consumers use cards without rewards—is important when 
considering consumer welfare on net. 
The definitive answers of whether the current rewards levels are wel-
fare-enhancing for consumers await further data. However, the analysis 
using available empirical evidence suggests the following. If the cur-
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not be welfare-enhancing for consumers on net, unless the rewards are 
made possible by the card service providers or the merchants giving up 
their profit margins. If the current rewards are too generous, consumer 
welfare on net may potentially be lower than in an economy without 
payment cards. As mentioned before, rewards that are too generous 
may require more real resources, and these extra costs might exceed the 
resource costs that are necessary to handle a cash or check transaction. 
Because it is very unlikely that card issuers set the reward levels that 
would make the card service providers as a whole earn negative profits, 
these extra costs may be shared between merchants and consumers. 
III.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article considered whether currently provided payment card 
rewards are on net beneficial to U.S. consumers. To this end, the first 
section provided background on the U.S. payment card industry, in-
cluding the prevalence of reward card programs, the relationship be-
tween rewards and other fees, such as interchange fees and merchant 
discount fees, and the roles of rewards cards. In the second section, the 
article first examined the most efficient rewards levels focusing on the 
role of rewards in internalizing the usage externality of payment cards 
and then discussed whether the current levels of rewards are welfare-
enhancing from the social welfare point of view as well as from the 
consumer welfare point of view. 
Available empirical evidence and existing theoretical models sug-
gest that current U.S. payment card rewards programs are likely ineffi-
cient. That is, social welfare is likely to be lower with currently provided 
rewards than without rewards. Similarly, consumer welfare is likely to 
be lower unless rewards are accompanied by the card service provid-
ers or the merchants giving up their profit margins. Further, both so-
cial welfare and consumer welfare may potentially be lower than in an 
economy without payment cards at all. To obtain definitive answers, 
more comprehensive data-gathering and further theoretical develop-
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APPENDIx
a. computation of the most efficient cardholder fees in the united states
As discussed in Section II, the most efficient cardholder fees depend 
on two elements. One is the payment card service providers’ joint net 
cost of handling a card transaction. The other is the merchant’s trans-
actional benefit from a card transaction. Tables below summarize the 
payment service providers’ costs and fee revenues and the merchant 
costs shown in Garcia-Swartz and others (2006 a and b). 
table a1




    Cash  Check  Credit  Debit
A $11.52 transaction 
  Resource costs  6.7  15.0  28.0  27.0
  Cardholder fees  3.0  4.0  -10.3  13.0
  Merchant fees  0.4  16.0  42.0  41.0
  Profit  -3.3  5.0  3.7  27.0
A $54.24 transaction 
  Resource costs  32.3  15.0  41.0  35.0
  Cardholder fees  3.0  4.0  -50.0  13.0
  Merchant fees  2.0  16.0  101.0  41.0






    Cash  Check  Credit  Debit
A $11.52 transaction 
  Fees  0.4  16.0  42.0  41.0
  Resource & other   30.5  28.2  21.0  17.1
  Total  30.9  44.2  63.0  58.1
A $54.24 transaction 
  Fees  2.0  16.0  101.0  41.0
  Resource & other   41.8  31.0  24.0  17.4
  Total  43.8  47.0  125.0  58.4
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These tables help calculate the most efficient cardholder fee of cred-
it and debit cards. For example, the most efficient credit cardholder fee 
when the alternative payment method is check is computed in the follow-
ing way: First, the net cost of a credit card transaction for payment service 
providers as a whole is the resource costs of a credit card transaction plus 
the opportunity costs of giving up the profits from a check transaction. 
For a $11.52 transaction, these are 28 cents and 5 cents, respectively. 
Thus, the net cost of a $11.54 credit card transaction for the payment 
service providers is 33 cents (=28 cents + 5 cents). Second, the merchant 
transactional benefit from a credit card versus a check is cost reduction. 
A $11.54 credit card transaction requires the merchants pay 21 cents in 
resource costs, which is a 7.2 cents resources cost savings because a $11.54 
check transaction costs merchants 28.2 cents. The merchants can also 
save the cost of paying fees for processing a check transaction, which is 
16 cents. Thus, their transactional benefit from a credit card transaction 
is 23.2 cents (=7.2 cents + 16 cents). The most efficient cardholder fee for 
a $11.54 credit card transaction when check is the alternative payment 
method is therefore 9.8 cents (=33 cents – 23.2 cents). 
Table A1, and thus, the most efficient cardholder fees in Table 1, 
exclude seigniorage—the net revenue derived from the issuing of cur-
rency for central banks. Seigniorage is estimated at about 7 cents and   
33 cents, respectively, for a $11.52 transaction and for a $54.24 transac-
tion. Therefore, if included, the payment service providers’ profit from 
a cash transaction becomes positive: 3.7 cents for a $11.52 transaction 
and 5.7 cents for a $54.24 transaction. As a result, the most efficient 
credit cardholder fees, given that credit card and cash are the two pay-
ment methods, become positive: 21.8 cents for a $11.52 transaction 
and 26.9 cents for a $54.24 transaction. Similarly, the most efficient 
debit cardholder fees, given that debit card and cash are the two pay-
ment methods, become positive: 16.9 cents for a $11.52 transaction 
and 14.3 cents for a $54.24 transaction.
B. The most efficient cardholder fees in australia
For comparison, tables below show the most efficient cardholder 
fees; merchant costs; and costs, fee revenues, and profits for payment ser-
vice providers in Australia. The source of information is Simes and others 
(2006). The numbers in parentheses indicate seigniorage is included. Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  59
table B1
MOST EFFICIENT CARDHOlDER FEES IN AUSTRAlIA
(unit: au cent)
 
Payment method      Credit      Debit
Alternative method    Cash  Check  debit  Cash  Check  Credit
Transaction value  AU$10  -1 (5)  -47  15  -16 (-10)  -62  -17
per transaction  AU$50  -14 (16)  -40  23  -37 (-7)  -63  -34
 
table B2
COSTS, FEE REVENUES, AND PROFIT FOR PAYMENT 
SERVICE PROVIDERS IN AUSTRAlIA
(unit: au cent)
    Cash  Check  Credit  Debit
An AU$10 transaction 
  Resource costs  5  16  16  6
  Cardholder fees  0  0  -2  0
  Merchant fees  1  8  12  12
  Profit  -4 (2)  -8  -6  6
An AU$50 transaction 
  Resource costs  15  16  24  6
  Cardholder fees  0  0  -11  0
  Merchant fees  1  8  46  12
  Profit  -14 (16)  -8  11  6
 
Table B3
MERCHANT COSTS IN AUSTRAlIA
(unit: au cent)
 
    Cash  Check  Credit  Debit
An AU$10 transaction 
  Fees  1  8  12  12
  Resource & other   38  73  26  21
  Total  39  81  38  33
An AU$50 transaction 
  Fees  1  8  46  12
  Resource & other   49  74  26  21
  Total  50  82  72  33
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ENDNOTES
1Those  surveys  are  Dove  consulting  and  American  Bankers  Association 
(2005) and Visa USA (2006). 
2According to a 2007 study by Dove Consulting, 37 percent of depository in-
stitutions surveyed offered debit card rewards in 2006. Among them, 63 percent 
offered rewards for signature debit transactions only and the rest of them offered 
rewards for both PIN and signature debit transactions.
3This comparison was made by Tony Hayes at the “Consumer Behavior and 
Payment Choice” conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in 2006. See 
page 23 of Carten and others.
4The Government Accountability Office (2008) reported that federal government 
entities receive at least 8 basis points of their spending on the cards from the issuers. 
5The 2005/2006 Study of Consumer Payment Preference. 
6A merchant acquirer is an entity that performs a variety of merchant-related 
payment activities, including processing card transactions for merchants. 
7There are some exceptions. In the early 1990s, interchange fees of some PIN-
debit card networks in the United States flowed from issuer to acquirer. In Austra-
lia, PIN debit (EFTPOS) card interchange fees flow from issuer to acquirer. 
8A merchant fee includes other fees, such as acquirer processing fees, which 
go to acquirers, and association dues and switch fees, which go to card networks. 
9A cardholder fee refers to per transaction fee charged to the cardholder. 
10Interchange fee variation can be seen in Chart 4. 
11American Express’s costs of marketing, promotion, rewards, and card member 
services account for 53 percent of merchant fee revenue in 2007. If American Ex-
press spent similar amounts to Visa and MasterCard for marketing and promotion 
($1 billion), then rewards costs account for 47 percent; if American Express spent 
twice as much as Visa and MasterCard, then rewards costs account for 40 percent. 
12Interchange fee rates for consumer credit cards and for commercial credit 
cards have been different.
13Payment float occurs due to the time lag between the time the payment is 
initiated and the time the fund is actually transferred. For example, there is a time 
lag between the time a consumer writes a check at a merchant and the time the fund 
is taken from the consumer’s bank account. Consumers may earn extra interest due 
to this time lag, but merchants may lose interest income due to this time lag.
14It should be emphasized that the merchant’s transactional benefit does not 
include the merchant’s other benefits, such as incremental sales, noted in the pre-
vious paragraph.
15Another downside is inconsistent results with the other studies. For ex-
ample, Star Cost Studies (2006, 2007) estimated that debit card issuers’ costs for 
PIN-debit and signature-debit were quite different, while Garcia-Swartz and oth-
ers (2006 a and b) estimated that they were somewhat similar. Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  61
16Comprehensive cost studies were conducted in other countries, such as 
Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.
17See appendix for the detailed calculation method. 
18The most efficient cardholder fees presented here ignore the credit function 
of credit cards because its effect on the most efficient credit cardholder fee is unclear. 
However, some studies suggest that the most efficient credit cardholder fee (rewards 
level) that takes into account credit function is likely to be higher (lower) than the 
most efficient debit cardholder fee (rewards level) (Bolt and Chakravorti). 
19Columns 3 and 6 are the same hypothetical economy, but these two are 
shown separately for the most efficient credit cardholder fees and the most ef-
ficient debit cardholder fee, given the other type of cards’ cardholder fee.
20The actual cardholder fees are shown in Table A1 in the appendix. 
21If seigniorage of cash is viewed as a joint revenue to the payment service 
providers, then providing rewards to substitute large value cash transaction is 
likely inefficient. See appendix for more detail. 
22In reality, however, not just two payment methods but several payment 
methods are used. In the case of multiple alternative payment methods, the most 
efficient cardholder fees would be the weighted average of the most efficient card-
holder fees, shown in Table 1. The weight should be based on the share of each 
payment method. 
23A similar cost study in Australia suggested that merchant transactional costs 
of checks are much higher and payment service providers’ processing costs of 
a credit/debit card transaction are lower in Australia than in the United States 
(Simes and others). See appendix. 
24Ching and Hayashi showed by using a consumer survey in the United States 
that removing rewards on credit and debit cards today would cause only a small per-
centage of consumers to switch from credit/debit cards to paper-based transactions.
25If the merchant fee is lower than the merchant’s transactional benefit, then 
a higher level of rewards does not necessarily imply higher retail prices. The higher 
the level of rewards, the more consumers use cards. Although the merchants pay a 
higher merchant fee, they may save more costs as more consumers use cards. If this 
cost saving is greater than the merchant fee increase, then the higher rewards may 
reduce the retail prices. According to the available cost studies, however, it is very 
unlikely that the merchant fee is lower than the merchant transactional benefit. 
26It is difficult to empirically examine how the fees paid by merchants affect 
the prices charged by the merchants, because the relationship depends on various 
factors. However, according to a merchant cost study, a merchant’s per transaction 
cost for a credit card transaction is higher than for a cash, check, or a debit card 
transaction due to the fees charged for a credit card transaction. Since most mer-
chants set the same price for their customers regardless of their payment methods, 
the higher cost of a credit card transaction for the merchants is likely to be passed 
on to all of their customers as higher prices.62  FedeRal ReseRve BanK oF Kansas CiTy
REFERENCES
Aite Group, llC. 2008. “The State of Rewards: The Consumer Voice.” 
Bergman, Mats, Gabriela Guibourg and Bjorn Segendorf. 2007. “The Costs of 
Paying—Private and Social Costs of Cash and Card Payments,” Sveriges 
Riksbank Working Paper No 212.
Bolt, Wilko and Sujit Chakravorti. 2008. “Consumer Choice and Merchant Ac-
ceptance of Payment Media,” mimeo.
Bradford, Terri and Fumiko Hayashi. 2008. “Developments in Interchange Fees 
in the United States and Abroad,” Payments system Research Briefing, Federal 
Reserve Bank of kansas City, April.
Brits, Hans and Carlo Winder. 2005. “Payments are No Free lunch,” De Neder-
landsche Bank Occasional Studies, 3(2).
Carten, Margaret, Dan littman, Scott Schuh, and Joanna Stavins. (2007). “Con-
sumer Behavior and Payment Choice: 2006 Conference Summary,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy discussion Paper, No. 07-4. 
Chakravorti, Sujit and William Emmons. 2003. “Who Pays for Credit Cards?” 
Journal of Consumer affairs. 27(2): 208-230. 
Chakravorti, Sujit and Ted To. 2007. “A Theory of Credit Cards,” international 
Journal of industrial organization. 25(3): 583-595. 
Ching, Andrew and Fumiko Hayashi. 2008. “Payment Card Rewards Programs 
and Consumer Payment Choice,” under review. 
Dove Consulting. 2007. 2007 debit issuer study.
Dove Consulting and American Bankers Association. 2005. the 2005/2006 study 
of Consumer Payment Preferences. 
Dowson, Amy and Carl Hugener. 2006. “A New Business Model for Card Pay-
ments,” Diamond Management & Technology Consultants, Inc.
Edgar, Dunn and Company. 2006, 2007. Payment dynamics Preferred Pay-
ments study. 
Financial Insights. 2005, 2007. Consumer Payments survey. 
Food Marketing Institute. 1998. ePs Costs: a Retailer’s Guide to electronic Pay-
ment systems Costs.
Garcia-Swartz, Daniel, Robert Hahn, and Anne layne-Farrar. 2006a. “The Move 
Toward a Cashless Society: A Closer look at Payment Instrument Econom-
ics,” Review of network economics. 5(2): 175-197.
Garcia-Swartz, Daniel, Robert Hahn, and Anne layne-Farrar. 2006b. “The Move 
Toward a Cashless Society: Calculating the Costs and Benefits,” Review of 
network economics. 5(2): 199-228.
Government Accountability Office. 2008. “Credit and Debit Cards. Federal En-
tities Are Taking Actions to limit Their Interchange Fees, but Additional 
Revenue Collection Cost Savings May Exist,” GAO-08-558. 
Green, Jeffrey. 2007. “Exclusive Bankcard Profitability 2007,” Cards & Payments, 
20(5):26-28.
Hayashi, Fumiko. 2006. “A Puzzle of Card Payment Pricing: Why Are Mer-
chants Still Accepting Card Payments?” Review of network economics, 5 (1): 
144-174.Economic REviEw • FiRst quaRtER 2009  63
Hayashi, Fumiko. 2008a. “The Economics of Payment Card Fee Structure: What 
is the Optimal Balance between Merchant Fee and Payment Card Rewards?” 
Federal Reserve Bank of kansas City Research Working Paper 08-06. 
Hayashi, Fumiko. 2008b. “The Economics of Payment Card Fee Structure: What 
Drives Payment Card Rewards?” Federal Reserve Bank of kansas City Re-
search Working Paper 08-07. 
Humphrey, David, Magnus Willesson, Goran Bergendahl, and Ted lindlom. 
2006. “Benefits from a Changing Payment Technology in European Bank-
ing,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 30 (6): 1631-1652.
National Bank of Belgium. 2006. “Costs, advantages and drawbacks of the vari-
ous means of payment,” economic Review, June: 41-47.
Reserve Bank of Australia. 2007. Payment Costs in australia: a study of the Costs 
of Payments Methods.
Reserve Bank of Australia. 2008. Reform of australia’s Payments system. Preliminary 
conclusions of the 2007/08 Review.
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole. 2002. “Cooperation among Competitors: 
Some Economics of Payment Card Associations,” Rand Journal of economics, 
33(4): 549-570. 
Rochet, Jean-Charles and Jean Tirole. 2006. “Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Re-
port,” Rand Journal of economics, 37(3): 645-667.
Simes, Ric, Annette lancy, and Ian Harper. 2006. “Costs and Benefits of Alterna-
tive Payments Instruments in Australia,” Melbourne Business School Work-
ing Paper No 8.
Simon, John. 2005. “Payment Systems are Different: Shouldn’t Their Regulation 
Be Too?” Review of network economics, 4(4): 364-383.
Star Network. 2006, 2007. Pos debit issuer Cost study. 
Visa USA. 2006. visa Payment Panel study.
Wang, Zhu. 2008. “Market Structure and Credit Card Pricing: What Drives the 
Interchange?” Federal Reserve Bank of kansas City Payment System Re-
search Working Paper.
Wright, Julian. 2003 “Optimal Card Payment Systems,” european economic Re-
view, 47: 587-612.
Wright, Julian. 2004. “The Determinant of Optimal Interchange Fees in Pay-
ment Systems,” Journal of industrial economics, 52: 1-26.
 